Abstract. We explore the procurement of influenza vaccines by a government whose objective is to minimize the expected social costs (including vaccine, vaccine administration, and influenza treatment costs) when a for-profit vaccine supplier has production yield uncertainty, private information about its productivity (adverse selection), and potentially unverifiable production effort (moral hazard). Timeliness is important-costs for both the supplier and the government procurer may increase if part of the vaccine order is delivered after a scheduled delivery date. We theoretically derive the optimal menu of output-based contracts. Next, we present a menu that is optimal within a more restricted set of practically implementable contracts, and numerically show that such a menu leads to near-optimal outcomes. Finally, we present a novel way to eliminate that information rent if the manufacturer's effort is also verifiable, a counterintuitive result because the manufacturer has private productivity information. This provides an upper bound for the government on how much it should spend to monitor the manufacturer's effort.
Introduction
Influenza is a respiratory illness that spreads rapidly in seasonal epidemics (e.g., see http://www.cdc.gov/ flu). Influenza outbreaks result in 300,000 to 500,000 deaths around the world annually. The World Health Organization (WHO 2008) reports that the annual costs of healthcare, lost days of work and schooling, and social disruption range between $1 million and $6 million per 100,000 inhabitants in industrialized countries. Vaccination is a primary means of preventing influenza (Gerdil 2003, Saluzzo and Lacroix-Gerdil 2006) , can be deployed in programmes optimized to limit influenza outbreaks (Nichol et al. 1994 , Weycker et al. 2005 , WHO 2008 , and can be complemented with antiviral therapy, social distancing, or other interventions , Wu et al. 2009 ).
This paper explores the acquisition of influenza vaccines by a government whose objective is to minimize the expected total social costs of influenza when a for-profit manufacturer of influenza vaccines has yield uncertainty in production (U.S. GAO 2001) and private information about its productivity. The government seeks to minimize its expected total health expenditure related to influenza, including vaccine procurement from a manufacturer, vaccine administration costs, and the cost of treating those that are ultimately infected.
While we use the term "government" for the vaccine procurer, the model is also conceptually valid for a healthcare management organization that procures influenza vaccines for a population in an effort to avert infections and infection transmission in that population, and for which it is liable for treatment costs (as might be consistent with ACOs in "Obamacare," U.S. Congress 2010) .
We address the question of whether the manufacturer can take advantage of its proprietary information (thus obtaining an information rent, or excess profits due to the information asymmetry) and how the government can design a procurement contract to minimize the advantage. In summary, we show that a manufacturer with private productivity information can command an information rent from a government unable to inspect the manufacturer's production effort. We construct a menu of contracts that minimizes the government's overall cost by balancing the trade-off between providing sufficient incentives to the manufacturer to exert an appropriate level of effort and the information rent that the manufacturer can extract from the government. Finding such a menu is a challenging problem as the set of potential contracts is infinitely large. However, we (1) construct a menu that can be shown to be optimal. Our analysis shows that this menu has certain peculiarities that make its practical implementation difficult. To overcome this, we (2) determine another menu that is optimal within a more practically viable family of contracts. Interestingly, our numerical experiments show that this menu leads to near-optimal outcomes. We then (3) derive a novel result that shows how the ability to verify a manufacturer's effort in a way that is contractible can eliminate the information rent even when there is asymmetric information about the manufacturer's productivity. This provides an upper bound on the value of the ability to inspect manufacturer effort. We also (4) provide a sensitivity analysis to identify parameters that most influence this upper bound.
The sequence of events and sources of uncertainty are important for the influenza vaccine supply (Gerdil 2003, Saluzzo and Lacroix-Gerdil 2006) . Three strains of influenza are selected in the spring for inclusion in vaccines to be shipped in the fall for use in the northern hemisphere. A small quantity of doses are produced for testing. This, together with information from preceding years, provides a probability distribution of the potential yield per dose of vaccine when production is ramped up to much greater volumes. Yield uncertainty may depend on both strain information (independent of the manufacturer) as well as some features of the manufacturer's processes that do not depend on the strain, such as breakage in material handling, spoilage, logistic challenges, or continuous improvement efforts. For example, Sanofi Pasteur, the largest provider of flu vaccines to the United States, delayed shipments of flu vaccines in 2014 "because one of the flu strains used to produce the shot grew more slowly than expected" (WSJ, Loftus 2014) . A different manufacturer delayed shipments that year "because batches made at a plant in Quebec didn't meet quality-assurance standards and were discarded" (Loftus 2014) , factors linked to a manufacturer's processes (Health Canada 2014) .
Prior to observing the yield for a given season's vaccine composition, the government orders a target number of vaccines for delivery. The manufacturer then selects its production effort during the primary production period. If the yield is sufficiently high, all vaccines ordered are shipped on time. If the yield is not high enough, a shortage occurs and not all vaccines can be shipped on time. Chick et al. (2008) derived contracts that could coordinate the manufacturer's incentives with socially optimal public health goals under the assumption that production yield distributions and cost information were known by both the manufacturer and government, and that there is no recourse for continuing production beyond a primary production period if the yield were low in a given season.
Communication with senior representatives of a major vaccine manufacturer indicates the possibility to extend an influenza vaccine production campaign for a few extra weeks in an attempt to fill the demand in campaigns when production yield is low. A two-stage production process has also been modeled in the literature before (Dai et al. 2016) . Such a late production period may result in a higher production cost per vaccine and per unit effort. Late production is more costly because the manufacturer has to reactively obtain additional raw materials (such as the eggs used in the dominant influenza vaccine production processes) beyond its initial commitments to its suppliers, incur handling and expedited shipments costs for delayed vaccines, and bear the goodwill loss. In addition, the late production period may also lead to opportunity costs for the manufacturer as now some of its resources that may have been committed to other vaccines would need to be committed to the processes involving the production and supply of influenza vaccines. For example, extended influenza vaccine production campaigns employ packaging and logistics resources that may also be used for other vaccines, hence increasing the carrying costs associated with higher inventories of other vaccines. Another potential interpretation of the late production period is one in which the manufacturer carries out a series of small production runs until the contractual obligation of the required supply of vaccines is met. Such a system could also exhibit a higher production cost primarily driven by the lack of economies of scale.
Here, we distinguish between yield uncertainty due to strain selection and a manufacturer's production technology and productivity, defined as the mean number of vaccines per unit effort. The latter can shift the distribution of yield higher or lower, depending on the internal improvement activities of the manufacturer. Therefore, a high yield of vaccine realized in one year might be attributable to a strain that is easy to manufacture in high volumes, or to manufacturing productivity, or a combination of both. Without the ability to inspect a manufacturer's processes, it is not clear how to disambiguate these factors.
In this paper, we assume that productivity is known privately to the manufacturer and allows for a late production period to complete the demanded number of vaccines. The primary production season reveals the yield at large-scale production volumes to the manufacturer. The manufacturer therefore experiences minimal yield uncertainty during the late production stage capturing the effects of learning due to experience, and we initially assume that the manufacturer can fulfill all demand in that late production stage. Similar assumptions have been made in the literature before. For example, Dai et al. (2016) assume that the late production period can deterministically satisfy for shortages from the earlier production run. As mentioned above, one may also interpret the late production period as a series of small production runs until the manufacturer is able Downloaded from informs.org by [216.165.95 .73] on 03 February 2017, at 07:09 . For personal use only, all rights reserved. 77 to fully meet its supply obligation. Such an operational system would also result in ensuring that the manufacturer is able to deterministically fulfill the shortage from the first production period. While this assumption is an approximation, and there has been a rare case where all production from a manufacturer for a given year has been wiped out (FDA 2005) , it is a reasonable approximation: such massive disruptions are infrequent. Numerical tests indicate that the proposed menu of contracts performs relatively well even if there are moderate shortages of vaccine.
Yield uncertainty and information asymmetry about productivity per unit effort subjects the relation between the government and the manufacturer to adverse selection. Moreover, because manufacturer's effort may not be verifiable, moral hazard is another source of inefficiency in the vaccine supply chain. Although the manufacturer's effort may be estimated by the number of eggs purchased, the actual effort may remain unknown without close monitoring due to unintentional loss of raw materials or efficiency problems with inputs (as opposed to inefficiencies with vaccines that are the output of the production process). While manufacturers focus on improving their processes, monitoring such efforts and quantifying their benefits come at a cost, which includes monitoring systems, certification, or process audits by third parties. We study the inefficiencies due to adverse selection and moral hazard in the vaccine supply chain, and we quantify the amount a government should be willing to spend in order to eliminate such inefficiencies.
Section 2 reviews related literature. Section 3 formalizes the mathematical model, a Stackelberg game of influenza vaccine procurement by a government from a single manufacturer whose payoffs depend on an epidemic model. Some results assume that the manufacturer's productivity is one of two types (high or low). Section 4 determines the manufacturer's best response to the government's order as well as the system optimum under the assumption that the manufacturer's productivity is common information. We use this framework to address the following questions.
• Can the manufacturer extract an information rent (surplus profit) if it possesses private productivity information (adverse selection) and its production effort is unverifiable (moral hazard) in this context with yield uncertainty? How can the government construct a menu of (output based) contracts that allows it to infer the productivity level of the manufacturer and minimize any eventual information rent? (Section 5.1)
• Can the government design a menu that is optimal within a more practically implementable family of contracts and yet leads to near-optimal outcomes? (Sections 5.2 and 6)
• How much information rent can there be with such contracts when they are implemented with parameters consistent with the influenza vaccine supply chain? What parameters are key drivers of the magnitude of any such information rent? (Section 6)
• Are the contracts robust to the assumption that all ordered vaccines are delivered? (Section 6.3)
• Is it possible to eliminate the information rent if it were possible to monitor and contract on the manufacturer's effort, hence removing the inefficiency due to moral hazard? (Section 7)
The affirmative answer to the last question is counterintuitive because the manufacturer's private productivity information would typically allow for an information rent. The negative answer to the preceding question provides some reassurance that the model may be useful even if not all assumptions are precisely met in practice. Taken together, these results suggest how much money the government might reasonably invest in technology and processes to reliably confirm the production effort of the manufacturer.
Appendices provide mathematical proofs of claims in the main text and related supporting material.
Related Literature
Our work is closely related to the operations management literature on influenza vaccine supply chains as well as the contracting and mechanism design literature.
The operations management (OM) literature has looked at three main stages in the vaccine supply chain. The first stage occurs before large-scale production and relates to vaccine development: the selection of which three strains of influenza the annual vaccine should include, and the timing of strain selection (Wu et al. 2005 , Kornish and Keeney 2008 , Cho 2010 , Özaltın et al. 2011 . The second stage is that of how the specificity of the influenza production process, most notably the production yield and/or market demand may influence incentives and decisions made in the influenza vaccine market or in production volume decisions (Deo and Corbett 2009 , Chick et al. 2008 , Arifoglu et al. 2012 . The third stage occurs after vaccines are produced: the allocation of vaccines or other resources to intervene in influenza transmission. This includes the role of customer demand (Arifoglu et al. 2012) , and the allocation of resources within a given population (Weycker et al. 2005 , Khazeni et al. 2009 , Wu et al. 2009 ) such as priority allocation to children in an urban area or across populations or countries represented by different governments (Brandeau et al. 2003 , Wang et al. 2009 . Dai et al. (2016) consider the role of the healthcare provider and explore novel variations on contracts to study the role of uncertain delivery timing, early production with design risks, and time sensitive demand. (2012) explore the role of governments in market coordination through subsidies, even with multiple manufacturers, but does not account for vaccine production yield uncertainty. Adida et al. (2013) present a menu of subsidies that leads to a socially efficient level of coverage even when yield uncertainty and network externalities are accounted for. Much of this work assumes that information is symmetrically known. We contribute to work on asymmetric information but do not account for consumer incentives as do some of the above works.
A major contribution of our paper to the OM literature on influenza vaccination is that we relax the assumption that all supply chain parameters are common knowledge. The supply chain in our model is subject to adverse selection (the manufacturer's productivity is not known to the buyer) and moral hazard (the manufacturer's effort is not verifiable). We show how the buyer can infer the manufacturer's productivity with contracts that do not necessarily rely on observing the manufacturer's effort. We further show that subject to the manufacturer's effort verifiability, a menu of contracts can eliminate all the informational advantage to the manufacturer.
A significant literature in OM handles the inefficiencies due to information asymmetry and moral hazard in a variety of contexts. In a quality management context subject to double moral hazard (but no adverse selection), Baiman et al. (2000) show that the first-best is obtained if either the supplier's or the buyer's effort is contractible. Corbett et al. (2004) examine the value to a supplier of obtaining better information about a buyer's costs but do not address moral hazard in their model. Cachon and Zhang (2006) characterize the optimal procurement contract menu in a buyer-supplier setup where suppliers have private information about their costs. They propose alternative simpler outcomebased contracts that perform nearly optimal. Crama et al. (2008) study a licensing contract design where the licensee's valuation of an innovation and its development effort are proprietary and construct a menu of three-part tariff contracts to align the incentives. Hasĳa et al. (2008) investigate the contract design to induce a vendor to choose optimal capacity when there is asymmetry about a call center's worker productivity. They show that a menu of contracts can reduce the information rent extracted by the vendor without a significant penalty to the supply chain performance. Yang et al. (2009) study a manufacturer-supplier dyad where the supplier is better informed on the likelihood of supply disruptions. Using mechanism design to construct the optimal contract menu, they show that the information asymmetry may cause the less reliable supplier to opt for a late penalty for the shortfall instead of using backup production. Kim and Netessine (2013) study incentive-compatible contracts in a supplier-manufacturer relation subject to double moral hazard and adverse selection to facilitate collaboration in developing new products.
Our work also relates to the literature on satisfying a "rigid demand" when the production yield is uncertain, thus requiring (potentially) multiple production runs (see Grosfeld-Nir and Gerchak 2004 for a comprehensive review). We consider a newsvendor setting with stochastically proportional production yield where the buyer, i.e., the government, decides on the fraction of the population to be vaccinated, resulting in a certain nonrandom demand for vaccines, and the newsvendor, i.e., the manufacturer, decides on the production effort. If the yield is low, the newsvendor has to run a more costly late production campaign to produce the remainder. The proportional yield we assume in our paper is commonly used in the OM literature (Li and Zheng 2006, Yano and Lee 1995) .
Our model of information asymmetry about productivity essentially unbundles yield uncertainty into external and internal drivers of variability (similar to systemic versus idiosyncratic risk in finance). This unbundling of yield is also relevant to agriculture, among other sectors. For example, the overall yield of a farm is determined by two sets of factors: (1) controllable factors such as crop rotation cycles (Hennessy 2006 , Livingston et al. 2015 or new technology adoption in areas such as irrigation or seed strain selection (Huh and Lall 2013) ; (2) unpredictable factors such as weather conditions (rainfall, humidity, temperature) or pest invasion (Kazaz and Webster 2011) . In this case too, yield can be decoupled into controllable productivity factors and residual yield uncertainty, which may vary year on year.
The incentive design and contracting work here contributes to a long line of related supply chain contracting literature (Cachon 2003 and references therein) . A substantial part of this literature studies the efficacy of different types of contracts to incentivize a buyer to order optimally to overcome the potential inefficiency due to double marginalization (Tirole 1988 , Pasternack 1985 . In these settings, the buyer's decision (order quantity) is assumed to be noncontractible. This assumption leads to underordering by self-interested buyers, thereby creating inefficiency in the supply chain. In such a setting, two-part tariffs (buy-back, revenue-share, quantity-discount contracts) are shown to overcome such inefficiency by providing incentives to the buyer to order optimally. However, when such settings also entail moral hazard (noncontractible efforts such as sales effort), these contracts fail to achieve coordination-in both order quantity and effort (Taylor 2002, Cachon and Lariviere 2005) . In the particular context of the influenza vaccine supply chain, our paper proposes an incentive-compatible menu of contracts to achieve socially optimum levels of vaccine production. This section formulates our public procurement model of influenza vaccines. The model accounts for the public benefit of the procured good, the manufacturer's economic and production model, and the government's procurement and deployment costs. We assume that there is a single for-profit manufacturer and the government is the single purchaser whose objective is to minimize the total financial burden of disease.
The public costs and benefits are modeled by assuming that if vaccines are procured for a fraction f of a population of N susceptible individuals then a number T( f ) of individuals are infected, with a total social cost of bT( f ), where b is the average cost per infected individual. Depending on the criteria set by the public decision maker, these costs include direct costs for treating infected individuals and may or may not include indirect costs associated with loss of work. Our results are based on general properties of the epidemic model, and do not look into its specifics, which might be a simple compartmental model (Diekmann and Heesterbeek 2000) or a more elaborate model with complex dynamics, plans that incorporate state-dependent deployment of antiviral therapy, social distancing, and so forth (Wang et al. 2009 , Khazeni et al. 2009 , Wu et al. 2009 . For stochastic models, T( f ) is the expected number infected.
Our results do assume that more vaccination gives better health outcomes, that the benefits vary smoothly with the vaccination fraction, and that T( f ) is convex for all sufficiently large f as in Assumption 1. Assumption 1 is valid, for example, with the standard SIR with vaccine model of influenza when f is chosen to be the critical vaccination fraction . We presume that the fraction f represents a commitment by the government for purchasing f N treatments with vaccines. The function T( f ) can represent the expected number infected when f N treatments are purchased but some fraction of treatments are not used due to vaccination compliance or spoilage issues.
The manufacturer commits to delivering f N treatments of vaccine based on the government's order. The production process for influenza vaccines is subject to statistical variation (U.S. GAO 2001 , Saluzzo and Lacroix-Gerdil 2006 , Loftus 2014 . We model this uncertain yield by assuming that if n units of production effort are used in a primary production period, a total of nθU treatments will be produced. Our setup is in line with the literature on rigid demand where a supplier has to fulfill the demand in its entirety subject to production yield uncertainty (Grosfeld-Nir and Gerchak 2002).
In our model, n represents the production effort (for the main influenza vaccine production technology today, this might be measured by the number of eggs input to the process, as eggs are a key input for that technology). The variable cost during the primary production period is c per unit of effort, for a cost cn.
The term U 0 models a stochastically proportional production yield (Henig and Gerchak 1990) and that may be due to differences in the strains selected for the vaccine, environmental factors, and natural variation from the production technology. The cumulative distribution function (CDF) of U is denoted G(u) Pr{U u}. Its probability density function g(u) is assumed to exist to simplify proofs.
The term θ models productivity factors that may be due to different operational practices and unobservable continuous improvement efforts that may improve the mean output per unit effort (e.g., by removing assignable cause variation). We presume that a manufacturer knows its value of θ but that the government might not. For instance, the government might believe that θ has a low or high value, θ ∈ {θ l , θ h } with θ l < θ h . The government is assumed here to believe that Pr(θ θ l ) q and Pr(θ θ h ) 1 − q.
A low yield may result in a shortfall of ( f N − nθU) + treatments. If a shortfall is experienced, then an additional ( f N/(θU) − n) + units of effort in a late production period are required to make up the difference. Note that while yield is unknown when the primary production decision is taken, its value is known rather well by the time the primary production period is completed.
+ is known at the time of planning for the late production period (this is valid not only for the vaccine manufacturer we communicated with, but also resembles challenges of some agricultural firms with regard to food production yield).
The cost per unit effort, L, to cover a shortfall is assumed to exceed that for effort prior to the target delivery deadline (i.e., L > c) for reasons given in the Introduction. Thus the manufacturer's total cost is
(1)
The manufacturer produces if only if MF(n; f ) R, where R 0 is its reservation value. The government's procurement and vaccine deployment costs are modeled by assuming that it pays p r > 0 per treatment ordered to the manufacturer, and has an expense p a > 0 per treatment that is administered if it is delivered on time. If treatments arrive after the delivery deadline, an additional fractional charge per treatment of δ 0 is incurred for vaccine administration. The government's total social, vaccine acquisition, and vaccine administration costs are therefore modeled by
Selfish and Social Optimum Outcomes with Known Productivity Factor
Before we analyze the incentive design problem with asymmetric information about the productivity factor θ, we first analyze the performance of wholesale price contracts relative to system optimality when θ θ i is known by both parties. This can serve as a benchmark, and will provide useful results for the analysis of the more complex problem with asymmetric information in Section 5. We do so in a game theoretic model with the government as the Stackelberg leader offering a take-it-orleave-it wholesale price contract to the manufacturer. A wholesale price contract is characterized here by {p r , f }, where p r is the wholesale price and f is the fraction of the population for which the government commits to buying and deploying vaccines. If the contract is accepted, the manufacturer chooses its effort n for production prior to the target delivery date. It must produce during a late production period if the primary production volume results in a shortfall of output.
We first consider a self-interested manufacturer. For a given fraction f , the manufacturer problem is to select n 0 to minimize its expected production costs during the primary and late production periods less its revenues, MF(n; f ) in (1). To do so, the manufacturer can use a newsvendor-type framework, which balances the expected marginal production costs for the primary and late production periods as follows. Proposition 1. Given a wholesale contract with vaccination fraction f , the manufacturer's optimal production effort in the primary production period, n *
We next consider a socially optimal response. The social optimum is defined relative to the minimization of the total costs of all players SF( f , n) GF( f ; n) + MF(n; f ) when actors coordinate to achieve that minimum without any self interest constraint. The social optimum is a reference for comparison for the case when all players act independently or when contracts attempt to align incentives. The system problem is
To avoid degenerate solutions to (3), we assume that administering the first treatment is cost effective in expectation for the system (otherwise it would not be optimal to vaccinate anybody). We also assume that the last treatment is not beneficial in expectation (which is reasonable given the herd immunity from vaccines and the challenge of full vaccination).
To formalize these assumptions, we introduce some notation. We define k S i so that it satisfies
which balances the marginal cost of an input and extra administration cost of the resulting doses in the late production period (the left-hand side) and primary production period (right-hand side). Note that k S i
exists and is unique because the left-hand side of (4) is
which will be seen below to be the expected marginal cost of administering and producing another treatment at optimality (cf. proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix A). The term i is thus the marginal cost of outputs.
We can now formalize the assumption that it is neither optimal to vaccinate nobody nor everybody, and characterize the optimal system solution for nondegenerate cases, assuming θ i is common knowledge.
Assumption 2. For the system problem and for a given θ i , producing and administering the first treatment is beneficial
b(dT( f )/d f )| f 0 + N i < 0 ,
and is not beneficial for the last treatment
Proposition 2. Given Assumptions -, the optimal vaccination fraction f S i and the optimal production effort n 
Note that if influenza transmission is modeled with the SIR model with vaccination, then Proposition 2 and Mamani et al. (2013, Theorem 1) 
is not less than the critical vaccination fraction.
When the value of θ is known by both parties, one can show that incentives can be coordinated by a wholesale contract only when there is no surcharge for the late administration of vaccines (δ 0 the optimal wholesale price contract cannot coordinate the incentives-it leads to lower vaccine fractions selected by the government and less production effort by the manufacturer than is socially optimal.
Importantly, a contract with a wholesale price, together with a shortage penalty for doses delivered in the late production period, can result in a first-best outcome for the government. These claims are justified in the online Appendix B and are useful for comparisons in the next section. These results complement Chick et al. (2008) , who show that output-based contracts cannot, in general, coordinate the supply chain (a necessary condition for attaining the first best). The reason that the contracts proposed in Proposition EC.3 of the online Appendix B attain the first best is that f is stipulated by the contract. In doing so, the government can eliminate any additional potential inefficiency in the system due to double moral hazard. That is, if f was to be determined after the contract is finalized in the system, then two decisions, f and the primary production effort n, need to be coordinated and this may lead to some inefficiency. Because f N is the order quantity, it (or simply f because N is known) can easily be included in the contract. Therefore, the contract proposed in Proposition EC.3 coordinates the supply chain and yields the first-best outcome for the government.
We now turn to the more realistic scenario of unverifiable effort and information asymmetry.
Unverifiable Effort and Information Asymmetry
If the manufacturer's effort n is unverifiable (moral hazard) and the manufacturer has private information about its productivity factor θ (adverse selection), can the manufacturer extract an information rent from the government? This section answers this question affirmatively when the government can only contract on the manufacturer's output. Interestingly, if the government can verify the manufacturer's effort, we also show that the rent can be eliminated. This section also shows how a government can induce a manufacturer to reveal whether it has high or low productivity (denoted θ h or θ l ) by offering a menu of output-based contracts. Each contract in the menu is designed contingent on a value of θ. The manufacturer chooses the contract that minimizes its costs. The optimal contingent contract minimizes the government's expected cost. According to the revelation principle, there exists a direct and truthful mechanism that is optimal (Laffont and Martimort 2002) . Here, we search among mechanisms that satisfy incentive compatibility (IC) and individual rationality (IR) constraints of the manufacturer. If the truth revealing contract leads to social optimum decisions and does not allow the manufacturer to earn any surplus over its reservation value, then such contracts are known as first-best contracts.
We begin by formulating the government's optimal contract design problem. Because effort is unverifiable, a contract can only be written in terms of a verifiable output (nθ i U), and the procurement order placed by the government ( f N or simply f ). Using the revelation principal, the optimal contract will be a menu with a contract tailored for each productivity type i ∈ {l, h}. Let j ∈ {l, h} index contract types. The transfer payment with contract j from the government to a manufacturer of type i with output nθ i U is τ j (nθ i U, f j ). The functions τ l ( ), τ h ( ) determine a menu of contracts. The government's optimal contract design problem can be written as follows:
The manufacturer's cost structure is defined in (7) and its optimal behavior is determined by (8). The IC constraint induces a type i manufacturer to choose contract i over contract j, or to reveal its type truthfully, so that θ i arg min θ j MF i, j (n i, j ). The IR constraint guarantees that a type i manufacturer achieves its reservation price. It will be convenient below to define A i, j as the expected shortfall of treatments and B i, j as the expected units of effort in the late production period when a type i manufacturer chooses the type j contract. The values of A i, j and B i, j are determined by the optimal value of n i, j in (8) and thus implicitly depend on τ j ( ):
(12)
A Linear Contract with Four Parameters Is
Optimal The government's contract design problem is complicated as it involves both moral hazard and adverse selection, and as shown in (6) We now construct a menu of linear contracts and prove that the optimal linear contract is optimal for (6). Each contract j ∈ {l, h} in the menu can be represented with four values: a vaccination fraction f j , a wholesale unit price p r, j , an additional unit price for each treatment produced during the primary production period p d, j , and a penalty per late treatment p s, j . Such wholesale-price-with-shortage-penalty contracts incentivize earlier production and modify the payoffs to the manufacturer. The transfer payment function to a type i manufacturer that selects contract j is therefore
for j ∈ {l, h}. (13) This transfer payment determines MF i, j (n) in (7) and creates a special case of the objective function in (6). Specifically, the optimal menu of contracts in the class of such linear contracts is the solution to the following optimization problem:
subject to the constraints in (7)-(11).
Proposition 3 shows that the optimization problem with arbitrary functions τ j ( ) as decision variables in (6) can be simplified to a problem with real-valued decision variables which determine τ j ( ) via (13). This theoretical result is of practical importance: restricting attention to linear payment/penalty terms does not hinder the contract designer's ability to sufficiently overcome agency issues.
Proposition 3. The optimal linear contract for (14) is optimal for (6).
The proof of Proposition 3 shows that the optimal contracts cannot attain the first-best outcome for the government and leave some information rent for the high-type manufacturer. Proposition 4 shows that the optimal menu leads to sufficient incentives for the high-type manufacturer to exert the system optimal effort. This result is referred to as a "no distortion for the efficient type" result.
Proposition 4. An optimal four parameter linear contract that solves
and f l solves
and p r, l
Importantly, the optimal menu implicitly results in n h, h n S h
, and p d, l < 0.
The optimal linear contract has a curious property: the low-type manufacturer is offered a negative payment (p d, l < 0) for each treatment produced during the primary manufacturing period: the agency setting has both moral hazard and adverse selection, so the government balances a trade-off between information rent (that the high-type manufacturer can extract) and effort distortion (which may happen for the low-type manufacturer). On the one hand, pushing the lowtype manufacturer's effort closer to the system optimal effort level improves the outcome for the government in terms of the number of treatments delivered during the primary production period. On the other hand, it increases the incentive for a high-type of manufacturer to pretend to be of low type in order to extract additional surplus. The government can incentivize the low-type manufacturer to exert an appropriate level of effort by carefully choosing a penalty for shortage (p s, l ). Although a negative value of p d, l attenuates the incentive provided via p s, l , it plays the more important role of ensuring that the high-type manufacturer (who is expected to have a higher output from the primary production period) is dissuaded from accepting the contract that is tailored for the low-type manufacturer.
A Simpler Menu of Contracts with
Three Parameters Proposition 4 identifies a practical challenge with implementing the optimal linear four parameter contract menu: a negative payment for output (p d, l < 0) Downloaded from informs.org by [216.165.95 .73] on 03 February 2017, at 07:09 . For personal use only, all rights reserved.
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may be difficult to implement even though the individual rationality constraint of the manufacturer is satisfied. For example, in cases with a limited liability, it may be impossible to enforce such a contract that does not have a limit on the potential payment that the manufacturer may end up owing to the government if the support of U is unbounded. Contract design in the context of limited liability often prohibits negative transfers (e.g., Gromb and Martimort 2007) .
To eliminate such issues, we next focus on a class of contracts that does not include p d, j terms: contracts are represented with three values: f j , p r, j , and p s, j . This class contains the linear contracts of Section 5.1 with the additional constraint p d, h p d, l 0. Proposition 5 characterizes the structure of the optimal menu of contracts in this class.
Proposition 5. In the class of menus of linear contracts subject to the additional constraint
dA l, l dp s, l
We will use the term "four parameter" when referring to linear contract menus in Proposition 5.1 and the term "three parameter" when referring to linear contracts in Section 5.2 with the constraint p d, h 0, p d, l 0. It is interesting to note that the optimal four parameter and optimal three parameter linear contract menus propose the same contract for a high-type manufacturer. Only the contract tailored for the low-type manufacturer differs.
We now further discuss the optimal three parameter linear contract menu in Proposition 5. The penalty per late treatment in the high-type contract is equal to the extra cost incurred by the government to administer the treatments. Also, a high-type manufacturer enjoys an "information rent" as its optimal cost is strictly below the reservation value R, while the lowtype manufacturer's cost is driven to the reservation value (the maximum cost at which the manufacturer is willing to participate). In other words, a high-type manufacturer enjoys a profit beyond its reservation value when information is asymmetric (we show in the online Appendix B that this excess profit can be eliminated if there is symmetric information).
Corollary 1 shows that a manufacturer with a higher production yield chooses a contract with a higher vaccination fraction. In fact, part (b) indicates that the optimal vaccination fraction and production effort under the high-type contract equal those for the system optimal solution in Corollary 1 when the manufacturer is of high-type, implying that there is no distortion for the efficient type. 
Numerical Evaluation of the Optimal Three Parameter Contracts
Given the practical limitations of the optimal four parameter contracts, we propose the use of the optimal three-parameter contracts when there is both unverifiable effort and information asymmetry. Therefore, it is important that we explore the performance of such contracts further. This section numerically analyzes the performance of the menu of contracts in Proposition 5. Such contracts allow the government to infer private information about a manufacturer's productivity, but cannot push a high-type manufacturer's cost to its reservation value. The gap Υ h R − MF h, h (n h, h ) is the information rent to a high-type manufacturer. We address the following questions: What is the loss in efficiency due to agency issues (adverse selection and moral hazard) when the government uses the optimal contract menu of Proposition 5? How big can the information rent be for a high-type manufacturer? What parameters most greatly influence that information rent? And, does the menu of contracts perform poorly if we relax the assumption that all doses must be delivered? We also implicitly provide an answer to how much a government should be willing to pay in order to verify a manufacturer's effort. This is because Section 7 shows the maximum it should be willing to pay is the expected information rent, (1 − q)Υ h .
The evaluation is done using parameter values that are illustrative for the influenza vaccine supply chain. Unless otherwise specified below, graphs and data assume c $6, L $8, δ 0.4, p a $40, q 0.35, θ h 1.2 (with θ l varied from 0.7θ h to θ h ) and yield U having gamma distribution with mean 1 and σ Parameters were also varied in experiments according to the values in Table 1 . We assume that the manufacturer's reservation value is R 0. The epidemic model T( f ) uses the standard deterministic SIRS model of influenza with basic reproduction number R 0 1.68 as in Chick et al. (2008) . In summary, the numerical experiments in Sections 6.1 and 6.2 suggest that information rent, both in total and per dose, can be significant, and identify parameters that influence that information rent.
1. The loss in overall efficiency due to agency issues when the government uses the menu proposed in Proposition 5 is between 0 and 2.8% (details are presented in Table 2 ). The loss of efficiency is defined as the percentage loss from the first-best system cost. This percentage loss is an upper bound for the loss for the government for using the menu proposed in Proposition 5 rather than the global optimal menu.
2. Information rent can constitute from 0% to 4% of the total government expenditure if the manufacturer is of high type. As the degree of uncertainty about the manufacturer's productivity increases (as θ l /θ h decreases) there is an increase in vaccine price for both high-type and low-type contracts, information rent, and total government expenditure; there is a decrease in the fraction of the population that is vaccinated if the low-type contract is selected. The information rent to a high-type manufacturer increases in q, σ 2 , L, and δ; it decreases in p a and θ l ; the total information rent is most sensitive to the range of uncertainty about the productivity of the manufacturer (as expressed by θ l /θ h ) and to the yield uncertainty for any given level of productivity (σ 2 ). There is moderate sensitivity to the administration cost per treatment, p a , and rather less sensitivity to the penalties associated with low yield/late delivery (L − c and δ).
3. The information rent per treatment is also very sensitive to θ l /θ h and σ 2 , but is less sensitive to the administration cost per treatment (raising p a lowers both information rent and the number of treatments); information rent constitutes approximately 25% of the vaccine price for a high-type manufacturer when θ l /θ h 0.7 and other parameters are set at their base values.
4. These conclusions are not sensitive to the assumption that all vaccines will eventually be delivered, and that the menu of contracts performs well, over reasonable ranges for the parameters.
In addition, the online Appendix C suggests a suboptimal but simpler menu of contracts in Proposition 5 that might be useful when the productivity of low-and high-type manufacturers are very similar. The online Appendix D provides a sensitivity analysis with caveats for designing the menu of contracts when some of the parameters are not known with certainty.
How Much Information Rent Can Be Gained from Private Information?
The information rent available to a high-type manufacturer in the optimal menu of contracts in Proposition 5 clearly depends on the discrepancy between a low-and high-type manufacturer's productivity (as described by θ l /θ h ) and the probability that a manufacturer is of a given type. fraction (f l ) of the population vaccinated and higher fraction of the population infected if the manufacturer is low type, a larger governmental expenditure in total (min GF) and for vaccines procurement and administration (vaccination spend) in expectation, and a larger information rent to a high-type manufacturer.
In particular, when θ l /θ h 0.7 in this example, the information rent to a high-type manufacturer is 4.54 × 10 8 /1.114 × 10 10 ≈ 4.1% of the expected total governmental expenditure. Table 2 also shows the percentage increase in costs under the proposed menu compared to the system optimal (first-best) costs. Note that this is the loss of efficiency of the optimal three parameter contracts compared to the first-best outcome; therefore, the percentage loss due to the use of such contracts instead of the optimal four parameter contracts will be strictly lower than the values reported in the last column of Table 2. A smaller θ l /θ h is associated with a smaller penalty for late delivery to the low-type manufacturer (p s, l ), and higher prices per treatment for low-and high-type manufacturers (p r, l andp r, h ).
If the government's cost of administration p a were twice as large ($80), a lower fraction of individuals would be vaccinated (0.412 to 0.440 instead of 0.539 to 0.567 for the low-type contract and 0.440 instead of 0.567 for the high-type contract), the total governmental expenditure would increase (1.680 − 1.719 × 10 10 instead of 1.067 − 1.114 × 10 10 ), and the information rent would decrease in both absolute terms and relative terms (when θ l /θ h 0.7 the information rent is 3.64 × 10 8 , or 2.1% of total governmental expenditure versus 4.54 × 10 8 or 4.1%). A larger p a is also associated with higher penalties for treatments delivered late by a low-type manufacturer, and higher revenues per treatment for low-and high-type manufacturers. Finally, the percentage loss from the first-best costs in this case is between 0 and 1.5%.
The information rent also depends on the probability Pr(θ θ l ) q that the manufacturer is of low type. In all numerical tests we ran, the information rent Υ h to the high-type manufacturer is strictly increasing in q. For example, if θ l /θ h 0.7, there is a 19.2% decrease in the information rent as q decreases from 0.9 to 0.1. Doubling the per-treatment administration cost to p a $80 almost doubles this percentage to 38.9%. In other words, there is a notable decline in information rent if there is an increase in probability that the manufacturer is high type. This decline is stronger when the administration cost is higher. Figure 1 indicates that the expected information rent (1 − q)Υ h increases as the discrepancy between the two types increases (as θ l /θ h decreases), and is inverse-U shaped in q, which is not surprising as when q 0 or q 1 the manufacturer's type in known and hence the information rent is 0. The expected information rent peaks at an internal value for q and decreases as q approaches the boundaries in the interval [0, 1].
What Parameters Influence the Information Rent the Most?
We first test the sensitivity of the information rent to a high-type manufacturer, Υ h , to the price of administering treatments, p a ; the extra cost of effort for late production, L − c; the yield variability, σ 2 Var [U] ; and the ratio by which administration costs increase if treatments arrive late, δ. We test the sensitivity by doubling each of these parameters for multiple values of the ratio of the mean yields of low-type and high-type manufacturing, θ l /θ h .
We then examine the sensitivity of information rent per treatment, Υ h /(Nf h ). Figure 2 shows the information rent Υ h that a hightype manufacturer enjoys in the optimal menu of contracts for two values of p a and two values of σ 2 . The information rent decreases in p a and increases in σ 2 . When θ l /θ h 0.7, doubling the standard deviation in the yield factor U (increasing σ 2 from 0.1 to 0.4) results in a 52% increase in the information rent when p a $40 (left panel) and a 40% increase when p a $80 (right panel). When σ 2 0.1, doubling the administration cost from p a $40 to $80 decreases the information rent by 19.9% (the equivalent decrease at σ 0.025 is 20.4%). The information rent decreases as the discrepancy between the production yield of high-type and low-type types vanishes and, as expected, disappears completely if the manufacturer is of a known type (θ l /θ h 1).
When the extra cost per late effort is doubled from L − c $2 to $4, the information rent is increased by 4.5% when θ l /θ h 0.7 and other parameters are as in the base case. As θ l /θ h increases to 0.95, the net increase in information rent from doubling L − c decreases to 3.7%. When δ is doubled from 0.4 to 0.8, the information rent is increased by 4.4% when θ l /θ h and other parameters are as in the base case. As θ l /θ h increases to 0.95, the net increase in information rent from doubling L − c increases to 7.75%.
In summary, in terms of the percentage change in information rent, doubling σ 2 has a bigger effect than doubling p a , which has a bigger effect than doubling δ, which has a bigger effect than doubling L − c. Greater uncertainty about the manufacturer's productivity (smaller θ l /θ h ) is also a key driver. Yield uncertainty and the government's cost of vaccine administration have a much bigger influence on the information rent than do the penalties that the government and manufacturer might incur due to late delivery of vaccines, at least when the parameters are initially set according to our base case (σ 2 0.1, c $6, L $8, δ 0.4, p a $40, q 0.35, θ h 1.2, θ l ∈ [0.7θ h , θ h )). The same general observation was observed for other tests we ran (e.g., with σ 2 0.025 or p a 80). Because the information rent and the information rent per person are proportional, comments about which parameters are most important for the information rent also apply to the information rent per person, Υ h /N. Figure 3 depicts the vaccine pricep r, h and information rent per treatment Υ h /(Nf h ) for a high-type manufacturer. As θ l /θ h increases both of those quantities decrease. If there is no uncertainty about the manufacturer's type (θ l /θ h 1) the vaccine price is lowest and does not include any information rent. If θ l /θ h < 1, the percentage of information rent in vaccine price is relatively independent of the administration cost p a . In particular, at θ l /θ h 0.7, 25.6% of the vaccine price is information rent at p a $40, and 24.6% of the vaccine price is information rent if p a $80.
The information rent per treatment Υ h /(Nf h ) might vary differently than the information rent in total or per capita as parameters are varied because those parameters may influence the number of individuals that are vaccinated in the optimal contract. For example, as L increases, it becomes more costly to produce in the late production period although a high-type manufacturer 
still pays the same penalty for late treatments (p s, h p a δ is independent of L). As a result, the government orders fewer treatments but pays a higher price per treatment. The overall impact is an increase in the manufacturer's profit and hence in the information rent. See Figure 4 . If θ l /θ h 0.7 and p a $40, then doubling L − c from 2 to 4 by raising L increases the information rent per treatment increases 6.0%. If p a $80, then doubling L − c by raising L increases the information rent per treatment by 4.4%. Thus, the information rent per treatment is increased by a slightly higher fraction than the total information rent per person when L is increased so that L − c doubles. When either σ or δ is doubled, the information rent per treatment is also increased by a slightly higher fraction than the total information rent per person (data not shown). When the administration cost is doubled, however, the information rent per treatment increases by 3 to 7% (depending on the value of θ l /θ h ) rather than being decreased by 19.9 to 17.1% as in the case of information rent per person. The reason is that the fraction of individuals that are vaccinated is highly sensitive to p a .
In summary, uncertainty about productivity (θ l /θ h ) and yield variability (σ) have the most effect on information rent per treatment Υ h /(Nf h ) (as for the case of information rent per person), and the effect of administration cost on information rent per treatment is somewhat less than that for δ and L − c.
Is the Contract Robust to the
"Full Delivery" Assumption? In the preceding sections, it was assumed that the manufacturer can deliver all vaccines that were ordered. While this can often be accomplished in the primary and/or late production periods, it is possible for a particularly low yield to occur, so that not all vaccines can be delivered in time for the influenza season. In this section, we analyze the potential that not all vaccines can be delivered, even during the late production period, by modeling a capacity limit for the late production period, and then assessing whether the menu of contracts are still useful even if there is a common belief that not all production might be delivered.
In particular, this subsection assumes that the maximum that can be produced during the late production period is a fraction α greater than what is produced during the primary production period (e.g., production can be extended by two weeks if needed). With this partial delivery assumption, the manufacturer delivers a total of d(α) min( f N, nθU) + min(( f N − nθU) + , αnθU) doses. This transforms the cost function of the manufacturer to
and that of the government to
We explored whether the use of the menu of contracts in Proposition 5, which assumes full delivery of vaccines, results in near-optimal or far-from-optimal outcomes when the government and manufacturer account for the potential of incomplete delivery by optimizing n and f with (16) and (17). This tests whether or not the use of Proposition 5 is sensitive to the assumption of full delivery of vaccines by the end of the late production period.
The degree of suboptimality from using the menu in Proposition 5 is very small as compared to the case 
when both parties account for the potential of partial delivery of vaccines in numerical tests. The percentage of suboptimality ranged from 0.20% to 0.63% when p a $40 and was even smaller (from 0.13% to 0.41%) when p a $80, over the parameter ranges in the preceding sections. These results assumed that α 0.10. Even for an extreme case of α 0 (i.e., no extended manufacturing period), we find that the percentage loss by using the menu proposed in Proposition 5 ranged from 0.44% to 1.01%. These computations were developed as follows. For a given type and the corresponding contract from Proposition 5, we compute the manufacturer's optimal production leveln i (i ∈ {l, h}) from (16). This determines the manufacturer's cost MF i and government's cost GF i from (16) and (17) (i ∈ {l, h}) givenn i and the contract terms, and thereby determines the expected total cost TC q(GF l + MF l ) + (1 − q)(GF h + MF h ). We then numerically solve for the optimal social cost SF i min n, f MF(n; f , α) + GF(n; f , α) for each type and the optimal expected social cost, SF qSF l +(1 − q)SF h . This procedure determines and expected loss, LS TC − SF. The quantity LS is an upper bound on the loss incurred by using the menu of contracts in Proposition 5 under partial delivery. Figure 5 depicts LS for p a ∈ {$40, $80} and α 0.1. In each case, the fraction of suboptimality, LS/SF, was less than 1%. The level of suboptimality was highest when the difference in low-and high-type was highest (low values of θ l /θ h ), where the information rent is also highest for a high-type manufacturer. Thus, the contracts appear to be relatively robust to the assumption of full delivery of vaccines, in these experiments with parameters that are representative for influenza vaccines. Even if we were to assume that α is a random variable with some distribution over the support [0, 1], it follows from our results above that the expected loss due to using the contract menu proposed in Proposition 5 would be under 1%. We conclude that the contracts in this paper are indeed robust to the "full delivery" assumption in this paper.
How Much Should One Be Willing to Pay to Verify Manufacturer Effort?
Sections 5 and 6 showed that the expected information rent, (1 − q)Υ h , is positive when the manufacturer's effort is unverifiable and its productivity is privately known. This is true even if a menu of contracts can elicit whether the manufacturer has a high or low productivity. This section assumes that the manufacturer's production effort is verifiable, and hence is contractible. That is, it explores adverse selection with no moral hazard. Here, we show that the verifiability of effort enables the government to eliminate the information rent even with adverse selection. Thus, (1 − q)Υ h is an upper bound on how much a government should be willing to pay to verify a manufacturer's production effort. We again assume that the yield per unit effort is θU where θ ∈ {θ l , θ h } with θ l < θ h , that θ is initially known to the manufacturer but not to the government, and that the setup is as in Section 4. We also will use the definitions in Section 2 of the effort n S i , vaccination fraction f S i , average cost to administer one treatment i , and critical limit of integration k S i for i ∈ {l, h}. From those definitions, the ordering of the θ i implies that k S l > k S h and that l > h . We also assume that the first treatment is cost effective and the last dose is not, i.e., Assumption 2 holds for both θ l and θ h .
Rather than trying to develop a contract that deals with the expected value of the costs given uncertainty about θ, we concentrate on contracts contingent on θ, as in Section 5. Unlike Section 5, one or more of the contracts can be based on effort. Proposition 6 shows that despite the information asymmetry, the government can design a menu of contracts based on input (effort) and output (shortage) measures that leads to "strict screening" between the manufacturer types without the need to pay any information rent, a first-best outcome. In other words, this menu resolves any potential inefficiency for the government due to the information asymmetry. The result in Proposition 6 is important and counterintuitive. Standard economic theory predicts that to elicit the "agent's" private information, the "principal" must pay a positive information rent to the informed agent. In a context with one supplier and one buyer, for example, Corbett et al. (2004) study different contractual forms and investigate the value of information for an uninformed supplier when contracting with an informed buyer. They show that the profit of the informed buyer decreases if the supplier obtains full information. Such a positive surplus that the informed agent earns under information asymmetry is known as information rent (Laffont and Martimort 2002) . In our setting, a menu with the manufacturer's effort and the realized shortage as performance metrics allows us to create countervailing incentives: if the manufacturer has a lower yield distribution, it prefers to be incentivized on its effort, else on its ability to satisfy the government's order. Although a positive information rent is a standard result in settings with adverse selection, contextual parameters may help reduce the amount. For instance, in multitasking settings, the principal can extract some of the information rent from an informed agent if there is a negative correlation between the costs associated with the different tasks that are to be carried out by the agent (Riordan and Sappington 1987) . Exploiting the differences in the queuing dynamics of two systems with equal overall capacity but different staffing level and productivity, Hasĳa et al. (2008) show that a rent-extracting mechanism can be devised using pay-per-call and pay-per-time terms in a call center outsourcing setting, where the agent is privately informed about its productivity. Proposition 6 adds to this literature.
An important element to note in our model is that a simple mechanism that ensures that the government covers the manufacturer's costs would also theoretically yield the first-best outcome. However, it trivially follows that such a mechanism would make the incentive compatibility constraints of both manufacturer types tight. In other words, such a mechanism would leave both manufacturer types indifferent between choosing the contract that is tailored for their productivity or the other. This implies that the government cannot guarantee strict information revelation from such a mechanism by providing an extra payment to one of the two contracts in the menu. Different from such a mechanism, as shown in the proof of Proposition 6, the menu proposed in Proposition 6 allows for a strict separation between the low type and high type and does not leave the two types indifferent. This ensures the practical implementability of the Downloaded from informs.org by [216.165.95 .73] on 03 February 2017, at 07:09 . For personal use only, all rights reserved.
Operations Research 65(1), pp. 75-96, © 2017 INFORMS menu in extracting information rent from the hightype manufacturer (i.e., a small extra payment added to the low-type contract will ensure the low-type manufacturer strictly prefers the low-type contract, without creating an incentive for the high-type manufacturer to switch to the low-type contract).
This allows us to devise a rent-extracting menu that leads to the first-best outcome, and justifies the claim that the expected information rent (1 − q)Ψ h is an upper bound on how much a government should be willing to pay to verify a manufacturer's production effort. Section 6 computed (1 − q)Ψ h for a range of reasonable parameter values for the inputs. We remark that those inputs suggest vaccination fractions that are similar to vaccination fractions reported for the United States although those vaccination fractions were not input into the analysis (CDC 2015) reported 2014-2015 influenza season vaccination coverage rates of 46.3% for those over 18 and 59.3% for children). Thus, the analysis of Section 6 may be a reasonable approximation to the value of verifying manufacturer effort, depending on the values of those parameters in a given year. The online Appendix D provides further caveats on the estimation of those parameters.
Conclusion
In this study of influenza vaccine procurement where production yield is uncertain, information rent is inevitable from a government to a manufacturer if there is both unverifiable effort and information asymmetry. Despite the challenge of solving a constrained optimization problem with a function as a decision variable, we are able to characterize a menu of contracts that attains global optimality. Further analysis of this menu suggests certain characteristics that render it impractical. Proposition 5 provides an output-based menu of contracts (output by a deadline) if the manufacturer is believed to be of one of only two types (low productivity and high productivity), that is optimal within a more practically implementable family of contracts. Our numerical experiments show that this menu does not lead to substantial losses due to agency issues. This menu is structured to encourage productivity improvements (low-productivity manufacturers get no information rent). Proposition 6 presents a novel menu of contracts that eliminates information rent if effort is also contractible.
Numerical examples with representative values for the influenza supply chain indicate that the information rent for a high-productivity manufacturer (when there is unverifiable effort and information asymmetry) can range from 0 to 4% of the total governmental spend on influenza vaccine procurement and administration and the cost of treating those infected with influenza. Key drivers of the information rent are the degree to which the government believes the manufacturer's productivity may vary (θ l /θ h ) and the variance in production yield for any given level of productivity, with vaccine administration costs also having an important but less strong influence. Less significant factors include higher production and administration costs incurred when low yields cause a late delivery of some treatments. The results appear to be robust to typical deviations from the assumption that all doses are delivered by the start of the influenza seasons.
The cost of monitoring manufacturer effort appears to be more than offset by the reduction in expected information rent that is afforded by the above menus of contracts, except potentially when there is a strong belief that the manufacturer has low productivity at the same time that the difference is small between low and high productivity levels.
Proof of Proposition 1. Given f , the manufacturer problem is strictly convex in n. This is because dMF(n;
Consequently the first-order condition (FOC) is the necessary and sufficient condition for optimality, i.e., n * i
follows from (2), which implies that f N/(θ i n * i ( f )) is a constant, which we call k G i .
Proof of Proposition 2. By Assumption 2, f > 0 and f < 1 at optimality. From (3), the KKT conditions for the objective
because terms with Leibnitz's rule that involve derivatives of the integrands have the value 0, and where γ is the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint n 0. We note that ∂SF( f , n)/∂n | n 0 c − p a δθ i E[U] − L < 0 implies that n > 0 at optimality, so γ 0. Then (18) implies 
and recalling the definition of i , as claimed in (5). We now verify the convexity claim. The Hessian of the objective function SF is
where Proof of Proposition 3. Let τ j ( ) determine the contract for type j ∈ {l, h} as in (13) with parameters f j , p r, j , p d, j , and p s, j so that the cost of an type-i manufacturer that chooses contract type j in (7) can be written
Positivity of det(H) implies that d
The manufacturer chooses n i, j to minimize its costs,
which uniquely characterizes the optimal effort level because the manufacturer's cost function is strictly convex in n:
From the revelation principle, the optimal menu of contracts must be truth revealing. Assume that an optimal menu induces orderf l and effort leveln l, l under the low-type contract andf h andn h, h under the high-type contract. We now show that the contract specified above by f j , p r, j , p d, j , p s, j can indeed match the order and effort amounts under an optimal menu of contracts. In other words, we seek to show the following four conditions. C1. Vaccine orders aref l andf h . C2. The menu of contracts induces optimal effort levelŝ n l, l andn h, h . C3. MF i, i (n i, i ) MF i, i where MF i, i is the manufacturer cost under the optimal contract.
C4. The menu of contracts achieves truthful revelation. Condition C1 is trivially satisfied by setting the orders equal tof l andf h . For Condition C2, note that the manufacturer's optimal effort level satisfies (20). Condition C2 is satisfied for any choice of p s, i if we set
So far, we have chosen f i and have shown how to choose p d,i for a given p s, i so that Conditions C1 and C2 are satisfied. We now need to choose p r, i and p s, i 0 such that Conditions C3 and C4 are satisfied. To do so, we denote by n i, j the optimal efforts of the manufacturer to minimize MF i, j (n), so that (20) is satisfied. We also letû i, j f j N/(θ i n i, j ) to simplify notation. With these choices, (21) implies that n i, i n i, i and that MF i, i (n i, i ) simplifies for i ∈ {l, h} as
Given (22), it is clear that Condition C3 can be satisfied for any choice of p s, i by setting p r, i so that MF i, i (n i, i ) MF i, i . Note that MF i, i R 0 is the IR constraint under the optimal contract.
It remains to choose the p s, i , using Condition C4. This condition requires that two inequalities hold:
Consider first Condition C4A. Choosing p r, h for any given p s, h to satisfy Condition C3 as above, substituting p d, l from (21) into the right-hand side of (23), and simplifying, we obtain
Recalling (22), p r, l can be chosen for any p s, l so that Thus, (25) can be rewritten as The right-hand side of (26) The second integral in the coefficient on p s, l belongs to MF l, l and is obviously positive. The first integral in the coefficient of p s, l is also positive. To see this, we distinguish two cases:
(i)û h, l û l, l or, equivalently,f l N/(θ h n h, l ) f l N/(θ l n l, l ). Becausef l N/(θ h n h, l ) u and so θ h n h, l u −f l N 0, it follows that the integrand is nonnegative over the interval of integration.
(ii)û l, l û h, l . In this case, we rewrite the integral as ∫û h, l u l, l (f l N − n h, l θ h u) dG(u).
Because u û h, l f l N/(θ h n h, l ), it follows thatf l N − n h, l θ h u 0; that is, the integrand is nonnegative over the interval of integration.
Therefore, there existsp s, l 0 such that (26) holds for all p s, l p s, l . The parameters p d, l and p r, l were determined to satisfy Conditions C2 and C3 for any such p s, l as discussed above.
A similar argument shows that Condition C4B can be satisfied by choosing a p s, h such that The right-hand side of (27) is linear in p s, h and with coefficient, which is positive (similar to the argument for C4A with p s, l ). Therefore, there existsp s, h 0 such that (26) holds for all p s, h p s, h . The parameters p d, h and p r, h were determined to satisfy Conditions C2 and C3 for any such p s, h as discussed above.
Proof of Proposition 4. We recall the optimization problem, which determines the optimal four parameter linear contract menu in (14) subject to the constraints in (7)-(11). The optimal manufacturer effort is characterized by (20) . To characterize the optimal menu, we first ignore constraint (10) from the optimization problem, solve the program and then show that the solution satisfies constraint (10). Let Λ be the Lagrangian for the relaxed problem and the Lagrange multipliers for constraints (9), (11) with i h, and (11) with i l, be α 1 , α 2 , and α 3 , respectively. We have dΛ dp r, l (q + α 1 − α 3 ) f l N 0,
dΛ dp r, h (1 − q − α 1 − α 2 ) f h N 0,
dΛ dp s, l dΛ dp s, l q (p a δ − p s, l ) dA l, l dp s, l − A l, l + p d, l θ l E [U] ∂n l, l ∂p s, l + α 3 A l, l + p s, l dA l, l dp s, l + (c − p d, l θ l E [ U] ) ∂n l, l ∂p s, l + L dB l, l dp s, l
− L dB h, l Dp s, l − A h, l − p s, l dA h, l dp s, l 0,
dΛ dp s, h (1 − q) (p a δ − p s, h ) dA h, h dp s, h + p d, h θ h E [U] ∂n h, h ∂p s, h + (α 1 + α 2 − 1 + q)A h, h 0,
0 α 1 (MF h, h (n h, h ) − MF h, l (n h, l )),
0 α 2 (MF h, h (n h, h ) − R),
0 α 3 (MF l, l (n l, l ) − R),
where A i, j and B i, j are as in (12). Combining (28) and (29) yields α 2 + α 3 1.
Equation (30) can then be simplified as dΛ dp s, l q (p a δ − p s, l ) dA l, l dp s, l + p d, l θ l E [U] ∂n l, l ∂p s, l + (α 3 − q)A l, l − α 1 A h, l 0.
We can now prove the following result.
Lemma 1. The high-type manufacturer is better off than the low-type manufacturer under both contracts in the menu, i.e., MF h, j (n h, j ) < MF l, j (n l, j ) for j ∈ {l, h}.
Proof of Lemma 1. By definition of n h, j , MF h, j (n h, j ) MF h, j (n l, j ). Therefore, MF h, j (n h, j ) − MF l, j (n l, j ) MF h, j (n l, j ) − MF l, j (n l, j ).
Because θ h > θ l , it follows that MF h, j (n l, j ) − MF l, j (n l, j ) < 0; hence MF h, j (n h, j ) − MF l, j (n l, j ) < 0.
From Lemma 1, MF h, j (n h, j ) < MF l, j (n l, j ). Therefore, MF h, h (n h, h ) < MF l, h (n l, h ) and MF h, l (n h, l ) < MF l, l (n l, l ). Because MF l, l R, we conclude that MF h, h (n h, h ) MF h, l (n h, l ) < MF l, l R. The first inequality follows from (9) and the second inequality from (11). Now, because MF h, h (n h, h ) < R, we conclude that α 2 0. As a result, (37) implies α 3 1 and (28) in turn implies α 1 1 − q.
Substituting the values of the Lagrangian multipliers into (38) and (31), we obtain 0 q (p a δ − p s, l ) dA l, l dp s, l + p d, l θ l E [U] ∂n l, l ∂p s, l + (1 − q)(A l, l − A h, l ) + p s, h dA h, h dp d, h + L dB h, h dp d, h p a δ dA h, h dp d, h + L dB h, h dp d, h + c ∂n h, h ∂p d, h 0.
Because dA h, h /dp d, h (∂A h, h /∂n h, h )(∂n h, h /∂p d, h ), we can rewrite (39) as dΛ dp 
From Proposition 2, it follows that n h, h n S h (no distortion for the efficient type). From (40) and (20), we obtain
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